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ABSTRACT 
 
Raftery (1993) has suggested that project cost estimates be presented in the form of 
cumulative probability functions (termed here 'Raftery Curves') rather than the current 
practice of single point estimates.  This paper describes a method for the empirical 
construction of the Raftery Curves for tender price forecasts.  This is applied to ten 
previously published data sets gathered throughout the world.  In comparing the resulting 
curves, the most consistent feature is shown to be the shift associated with to the number 
of bidders entering bids for contracts.  This is examined both in terms of bias and 
consistency.  Contrary to some previous studies, no evidence was found of any trends 
related to the value size of projects. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
"The construction industry has a reputation for delivering expensive projects late.  
Forecasts of project costs are frequently exceeded because of the lack of repetition caused 
by the bespoke nature of the industry's products, its transient itinerant production teams, 
and volatile market" (Raftery, 1993:7).  Training people to increase their understanding 
and awareness of risk attitude and to help them make consistent decisions using informal 
approaches may be the best solution.  What is needed, therefore, are financial forecasts 
which explicate the uncertainties in a simple form for practice and to present the 
practitioner decision-maker with an unbiased, consistent and unequivocal statement of the 
true nature of the forecast.  According to Raftery, many of the difficulties encountered in 
practice, particularly in communicating estimates of individual project costs, would be 
overcome by presenting these estimates in probabilistic form. 
 
The curve shown in the lower diagram of Fig 1 illustrates his position.  Here the estimated 
project cost, in millions of pounds, is predicted to lie within a range, shown qualitatively 
as ranging from 'low' to 'high'.  On the vertical axis is shown the percentage of chance that 
the actual project cost will be below any given cost.  The vertical line in the middle of the 
diagram indicates the best estimate for the project so that any values to the right of this 
can be taken to be 'conservative', that is there is less than a 50/50 chance that the actual 
project cost will exceed this figure.  Conversely, any values to the left of this figure are 
regarded as 'risky' as there is less than a 50/50 chance that the actual project cost will be 
lower. 
 
To date, little has been written concerning the calibration of Raftery curves.  One obvious 
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approach is for the calibrator to do this subjectively by relying on experience and 
professional judgement.  To be more objective requires the acquisition and analysis of 
data concerning past estimated, and their associated accounted (actual), costs.  There are 
problems, however, surrounding the use of accounted costs in the construction industry: 
 
• they are not usually readily available. 
• when they are available, their accuracy is not vouchsafed 
• due to the long delay between the estimated and the related accounted costs, significant 
changes in circumstances (eg., design changes, economic conditions) are likely to 
have occurred. 
 
An alternative to the use of accounted costs is to construct Raftery Curves for tender price 
forecasts.  Here the purpose is to predict the likelihood of the lowest tender price being 
above or below some percentage of the forecast.  This overcomes all the problems 
involved with accounted costs as they are available readily and timely. 
 
There are two distinct approaches to constructing Raftery Curves for tender price 
forecasting.  The first is to synthesise the individual variability of each of the components 
of the project via, for instance, a bill of quantities or schedule of rates.  The second, and 
the one used in this paper is to use empirical analysis of past projects.  It is shown that 
applying this method to several datasets gathered from around the world enables 
comparisons to be made and some generalisations drawn - particularly concerning the 
effects of the number of bidders. 
 
 
REALISATION 
 
There is no real difficulty in constructing a tender price forecast Raftery Curve from 
existing contract records.  Fig 2 shows how this can be done using data provided by a 
USA building contractor (Broemser, 1968).  Here the data set contained records of the 
contractor's cost estimates over a series of 76 building contracts in the 1960s. 
 
The cost estimate for each contract is compared with the lowest bid, for each contract 
to give a measure of percentage 'accuracy' of the estimate.  These percentages are then 
grouped into 5 percent bands and the number falling within each band is recorded.  
The dark shaded histogram shows the results of this for Broemser's data to which a 
normal distribution curve has been fitted.  The superimposed Raftery Curve shows the 
cumulative version of this distribution curve.  It can be seen from this graph that the 
lowest bid ranges from around 20% below to 20% above the estimate and, by reading 
off the vertical axis, the percentage of contracts can be found for which the lowest bids 
are below some percentage of the estimate.  Dividing the percentage on the vertical axis 
by 100 allows this to be treated as a probability. 
 
So, when Broemser's contractor calculates the cost estimate for the next contract, the 
Raftery Curve can be used to find the probability that the lowest bid will be within a range 
of plus or minus 1%, 5% or whatever percentage wanted.  Conversely, the contractor can 
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also find the range within which the lowest bid is likely to fall.  In this case, there is a 
95% chance that the lowest bid will fall within plus or minus 11% of the estimate. 
 
Further Raftery Curves have been developed in this way for a series of datasets1, 
including designers' tender price forecasts, as Raftery curves can also be constructed for 
designers as a means of informing on the likely range of the lowest bid for a contract.  
These data sets, including Broemser's set, are summarised in Table 1, and the resulting 
distribution curves are shown in Fig 3. 
 
From a practical point of view, some improvement is needed on this method.  Firstly, the 
purpose of the Raftery Curve is to provide information for a specific contract and yet to 
construct accurate curves by this method, data for many contracts have to be aggregated.  
Of course, the data could be restricted to a sample containing, say, similar buildings.  This 
would give a more representative curve but, with less data, would be less accurate.  
Secondly, most firms in the construction industry are very small and therefore are not able 
individually to assemble data on a big enough scale to match the examples provided here. 
 
Ideally, a specific contract curve needs to be constructed by reference to the 
characteristics of that contract.  In other words, a model is needed which embodies the 
relationship between the relevant contract characteristics and Raftery Curves so that, by 
entering the values of a new contract into the model, an accurate prediction of the curve 
for that contract can be made. 
 
How can the relationships needed for such a model be found?  The first problem 
encountered in this is the severe lack of data on the subject.  Most estimators do not record 
the kind of information needed and the major procurement agencies who keep suitable 
records on any scale do not usually allow access to such records.  On the other hand, there 
have been several studies in related topics.  Each of these sheds a little light on the 
problem. 
 
The relationships sought can be divided into either local or universal relationships.  The 
main interest here is in the universal relationships.  By examining several sets of data, it is 
hoped to detect common trends.  All the 10 distribution curves shown in Fig 3 for 
example have been constructed on the Normal model, which means they differ only in 
respect of their spread and position on the horizontal axis.  In terms of estimating 
performance, these can be interpreted as measures of consistency and bias respectively. 
 
In Fig 3, the narrow lines represent the smaller datasets (less than 100 contracts) and the 
wider lines represent the larger datasets (over 100 contracts).  There are clear differences 
between the data sets, both in terms of consistency and bias.  The contractors' data (first 
four datasets) are much more consistent whilst the designer/consultant data sets vary 
greatly both in bias and consistency.  Why should this be? 
 
                                                 
1 Details of the nature, origin and timing of the estimates used can be found in the 
original papers containing the datasets. 
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There are several possible reasons: the contractors are expected to be better than the 
consultants as they have access to better information on actual construction costs and 
spend far more time in preparing their estimates.  Also 'McRoad' and 'USA Govt', with the 
greatest inconsistency, are concerned with engineering projects which are known to be 
more difficult to estimate. 
 
For a more comprehensive account, we need to consider the general field of construction 
price forecasting, and the little theory that exists on the subject.  To date, the main 
emphasis on research in this area has been in target related matters - contract size, type, 
geographical location, procurement system and number of bidders - as well as more 
environmental aspects such as the general economic climate, but with mixed results.  Of 
these, the most recurring 'effect' is, perhaps surprisingly, the number of bidders. 
 
 
NUMBER OF BIDDERS EFFECT 
 
Bias 
 
The data were ordered against the number of bidders in each contract auction and the 
mean trends modelled by a bivariate regression analysis with the a power term selected 
from -2, -1.5, -1, -0.5, 0.5, 1, 1.5, 2.0 or log according to the r2 obtained.  The results are 
summarised in Table 2.  This shows each database with number of contracts, best r2 
obtained, power/log term, regression constant and coefficient and significance of the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for normality on the residuals (the 'upper sd' and 'lower sd' 
figures are described later). 
 
The regression curves are illustrated in Fig 4 with the line thicknesses again being shown 
in proportion to the size of the dataset involved.  This confirms the general downward 
trend of the means in nine of the 10 data sets and a concave asymptotic shape for seven 
out of these nine.  It can also be seen that all four of the contractor's data sets converge 
asymptotically close to zero error for contracts with four or more bidders.  For the non-
contractor data, the pattern of the trend lines is less similar but there would appear to be a 
drop in price levels of from around plus 10% to minus 10% over a range of 2 to 15 
bidders. 
 
Several studies have been published which report on this 'effect'.  Runeson and Bennett's 
analysis of 240 New Zealand Ministry of Works and Development building contracts 
revealed a similar trend averaged over each bid set (Runeson and Bennett, 1983).  The 
phenomenon also occurred with Handscomb's analysis of 1100 USA Corps of Engineers 
DD813 averaged entries (Hanscomb Associates, 1984).  
 
The United Hospital Fund of New York publish a similar model for estimators to enable 
adjustments to be made where there are more or less than 6 bidders involved (Hanscomb 
Associates, 1984).  This has been checked and revised by Hanscomb, based around seven 
bidders (Hanscomb Associates, 1984). 
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Other studies have found additional effects.  Harvey's (1979) analysis of 2401 public 
works contracts across all Canada found the trend differed according to the value size of 
contracts although this was reversed in Flanagan and Norman's (1983) analysis of 63 UK 
County Council contracts.  Value size effects similar to Harvey's were also found in 
Wilson et al's, (1987) analysis of 410 Australian State of Victoria Public Works contracts 
together with a smaller effect due to the presence or absence of a client provided bill of 
quantities in the procurement process.  Harvey also found differences between various 
types of contracts. 
 
Finally, in one of the most interesting studies of this kind, De Neufville's analysis 
(Neufville de et al, 1977) of 167 Massachusetts Bureau of Building contracts showed a 
clear distinction between 'good years', when there was much work on the market, and 'bad 
years', when bidders were desperate for work. 
 
On this evidence, it seems there may well be a universal 'number of bidders effect'.  What 
is less obvious however is the status of the other 'effects' observed in these studies.  Apart 
from value size, none of these other effects have yet been tested by replication.  Even with 
value size, the effects are not at all consistent.  A major study by Morrison and Stevens 
(1980) over several estimating organisations found the effect to change from one 
organisation to another. 
 
To check this with our data sets, each set was split into larger and smaller contracts after 
adjusting for inflation where possible, and a trend line was fitted to each (Tables 3 and 4). 
 The differences between the trend line for larger and smaller contracts are shown in Fig 5. 
 All of the eight analysable data sets show a minimum difference between errors at around 
eight bidders, the typical norm for construction contract auctions, with larger contracts 
being underestimated between zero and 6-7% more than smaller contracts. 
 
For auctions with over eight bidders, six of the 8 data sets continue to show larger 
contracts more underestimated with all except one of these being within 4% difference.  
Below eight bidders, there is a suggestion that the reverse might apply for most of the data 
sets.  Overall, it is difficult to see any non-local effect other than a tendency to 
underestimate larger contracts a few percentages more than smaller contracts. 
 
 
Consistency 
 
A power/log bivariate regression was carried out on number of bidders variable with the 
absolute values of the residuals arising from the 'bias' analysis.  Where the main regression 
in the bias analysis had failed the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, the positive and negative 
residuals were analysed separately.  The results are shown in the 'upper sd' and 'lower sd' 
sections of Table 2.  These indicate the trend of the consistency of the forecasts in terms of 
standard deviation (Gujarati, 1988:330) and are illustrated in Fig 6.  This shows that seven 
data sets decrease whilst three increase with number of bidders.  The contractors' standard 
deviations are the smallest over the 2 to 7 bidder range and, apart from the USA Govt 
data, all are within 11% or less for 7 bidders or more, and diminishing to 7% or less at 14 
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bidders for all but 2 of the data sets. 
 
There are no published studies on the effects of other variables on consistency in relation 
to the number of bidders.  Tables 3 and 4 summarise the results of the analysis and Fig 7 
illustrates the differences in forecast standard deviations between larger and smaller 
contracts.  For four of the data sets, the forecast standard deviations are greater for larger 
contracts and four are less indicating no obvious universal trend for contract value size. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper shows how Raftery Curves for tender price forecasts may be constructed both 
empirically and theoretically as well as having the additional benefit of helping remove 
some of the difficulties encountered in practice.  This involves ordering the percentage 
differences between tender price forecasts (estimates) and the actual lowest tenders and 
converting the resulting frequency distribution into parametric form.  Comparisons made 
when applied to previously published data gathered from around the world, suggest that 
systematic shifts (biases) in the curves are related to the number of bidders involved in 
setting the contract value and systematic changes in shape (consistency) are related to the 
type of project (building/engineering) and purpose of estimate (contractor's cost 
estimate/engineer's price estimate).  Once allowing for number of bidders, however, no 
evidence was found to suggest the existence of any systematic effects related to contract 
values.  This is contrary to previous published work in the field (Morrison, 1984). 
 
One surprising result is the lack of any clear relationship between consistency and the 
number of bidders.  This brings into question the efficacy of bidding models, which 
predict a decrease in consistency with increasing number of bidders. 
 
It should be noted that only a few obvious predictor variables have been used in the 
analysis.  Many others are possible, such as the type and geographical location of the 
project, procurement system and prevailing general economic climate.  In addition, the 
work reported here relates only to aggregated contract data obtained from individual 
companies and therefore precludes any analysis of the individual estimators involved.  
Other work by Skitmore et al (1990) investigating the accuracy of early stage contract 
price forecasts found significant differences in both bias and consistency between 
individual estimators that were attributable to the estimators' specific project estimating 
experience.  It is suggested therefore that any further work in predicting Raftery Curves 
make due allowance for this phenomenon. 
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Table 1.  Summary of datasets used in the analysis 
  
Name Description   
Broemser a contractor's cost estimates for 76 USA building contracts in the 
1960s (Broemser, 1968). 
London a contractor's cost estimates for 36 London building contractors in 
1979 (Skitmore, 1986). 
Benjamin a contractor's cost estimates for 130 USA building contractors in the 
1960s (Benjamin, 1969). 
Shaffer a contractor's cost estimates for 50 USA building contractors in the 
1960s (Shaffer and Micheau, 1971). 
Runeson State of Victoria quantity surveyor's price estimates for 154 building 
contracts, mainly housing, in the 1970s (Runeson, 1976). 
McBuild Belgian public works engineer's price estimates for 129 building 
contracts, mainly housing, in the 1970s (McCaffer, 1976). 
Gunner a Singaporean private quantity surveyor's price estimates for all 181 
of the practice's projects over a ten year period in the 1980s and 
including many of the major construction projects carried out in 
Singapore during that time. 
Tan a UK Local Authority Architect's Department quantity surveyor's 
price estimates for 33 small building projects in the 1980s (Tan, 
1988). 
McRoad Belgian public works engineer's price estimates for 154 roads 
contracts in the 1970s (McCaffer, 1976). 
USAGovt a major USA Government aeronautical agency cost engineer's price 
estimates for 291 contracts in the 1970s.  The data are restricted to 
construction work although much of this is of an engineering nature.  
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Table 2: Percentage low bid above estimate vs number of bidders 
 
 
Regression Upper sd Lower sd 
Source N Cases r2 Trans Const Coeff K-S r2 Trans Const Coeff r2 Trans Const Coeff 
Broemser  76 .0092 -2.0  -1.293 +15.3761 ns .0180 -2.0  +4.787 -13.1903 .0180 -2.0  +4.787 -13.1903 
London  34 .0187 -2.0  +0.422 -46.3808 ns .0371 +1.0  +6.769 -0.4927 .0371 +1.0  -6.769 +0.4927 
Benjamin 130 .0272 -2.0  -0.713 +23.7288 ns .1482 -1.0  +0.940 +21.5442 .1482 -1.0  -0.940 -21.5442 
Shaffer  50 .0345 -2.0  -3.233 +22.9961 sig .2316 -1.5  +6.268 -12.2027 .0505 -0.5 -18.431 +19.4773 
Runeson 154 .1162  log +10.046 -7.4152 sig .0275 +1.0 -16.757 +0.5467 .0607 log +17.505 -4.3108 
McBuild 129 .2784 +2.0 +16.171 -0.1991 ns .0209 -1.5 +11.237 -23.6995 .0209 -1.5 -11.237 +23.6995 
Gunner 179 .0396 -1.0  -8.616 +15.3928 sig .0060 -2.0  -6.442 -24.5822 .0648 -1.0  +2.562 +24.5479 
Tan 33 .0706 +1.5 +20.479 -1.2569 ns .0222 +2.0 +17.506 -0.1355 .0222 +2.0 -17.506 +0.1355 
McRoad 154 .1456 -1.5 +90.001 +90.4888 sig .0589 +0.5 +31.944  -8.2786 .0206 -2.0 -11.077 -25.3297 
USA Govt  292 .0707 -0.5 -35.311 +62.8240 ns .0277 -2.0 +16.128 +49.3256 .0277 -2.0 -16.128 -49.3256 
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Table 3: Percentage low bid above estimate vs number of bidders'large' contracts 
 
 
Regression Upper sd Lower sd 
Source N Cases r2 Trans Const Coeff K-S r2 Trans Const Coeff r2 Trans Const Coeff 
Broemser 38  .0048  1.0  -1.944  +0.1458 ns .0536  log  +7.666  -1.9396 .0536  log  -7.666  +1.9396 
Benjamin 65 .0371  1.0  +2.405  -0.3472 ns .0143  log  +4.504  -0.8150 .0143  log  -4.504  +0.8150 
Shaffer  25   .0419 -2.0  -3.418 +25.6812 ns .0807 -1.5  +7.663 -19.0493 .0807 -1.5  -7.663 +19.0493 
Runeson 77 .1508 log +10.496 -7.3511 ns .0385 -2.0  +3.942 +35.6858 .0385 -2.0  -3.942 -35.6858 
McBuild 64 .1534 +1.0 +24.087 -2.3534 ns .0443 -1.5 +12.826 -33.3917 .0443 -1.5 -12.826 +33.3917 
Gunner 63 .0725  log  +5.037  -4.7688 ns .0167 +1.0 +10.145 -0.2366 .0167 +1.0 -10.145 +0.2366 
McRoad 77 .2157 -1.0 +83.322 +94.0254 ns .0415  log +23.739  -6.3320 .0415  log -23.739  +6.3320 
USA Govt 146    .0810 +1.0  +1.686  -1.6457 ns .0236 -1.5 +12.658 +25.2439 .0236 -1.5 -12.658 -25.2439 
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Table 4: Percentage low bid above estimate vs number of bidders 'small' contracts 
 
Regression Upper sd Lower sd 
Source N Cases r2 Trans Const Coeff K-S r2 Trans Const Coeff r2 Trans Const Coeff 
Broemser 38 .0468  1.0  +2.923  -0.4969 ns .1048  log  -1.348  +3.0419 .1048  log  +1.348  -3.0419 
Benjamin 65 .0399 -2.0  -1.060 +31.5203 ns .1862 -0.5  -4.782 +26.1660 .1862 -0.5  +4.782 -26.1660 
Shaffer 24 .0287 -1.0  -7.999 +14.0035 ns .0665 -1.5  +8.686 -14.6122 .0665 -1.5  -8.686 +14.6122 
Runeson 76 .1039 log  +8.092 -7.0223 sig .0644 -2.0  +4.032 +32.7458 .0849 -2.0  -3.855 -58.9451 
McBuild 65 .3387 +1.0 +24.407 -3.1310 ns .0122 -2.0  +9.870 -27.6887 .0122 -2.0  -9.870 +27.6887 
Gunner 61 .0307 -1.0 -13.372 +22.9648 ns .0666 +1.0 +25.216 -1.5085 .0666 +1.0 -25.216 +1.5085 
McRoad 76 .1303 -1.0 +80.700 +67.3943 ns .0361 +1.0 +18.989  -1.4707 .0361 +1.0 -18.989  +1.4707 
USA Govt 145    .0562 -1.5 -17.483 +75.0556 ns .0076 +1.0 +22.521  -0.3969 .0076 +1.0 -22.521  +0.3969 
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Fig. 1. The Raftery Curve (reproduced from Raftery (1993) 
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Fig 3: Distribution curves for 10 datasets
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Fig 4: Mean trend for all datasets
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Fig 5: Difference between mean trends for large and small contracts
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Fig 6: Standard deviation trend for all datasets
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Fig 7: Difference between standard deviation trends for large and small contract
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